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USE OF A SUPERVISORY SAFETY CHECKLIST AND SAFETY
MEETINGS TO REDUCE AND PREVENT HAZARDOUS SAFETY
CONDITIONS IN AN AUTOMOTIVE PLANT

Todd Alan Brighton, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1985

Hazardous safety conditions and incidents were operationally
defined for an assembly division at an automotive plant.

The

conditions were observed and recorded on two different employee shifts
fo r an 11 week period.
distinct phases.

The experimental design used had three

In the f ir s t phase baseline data were recorded on

the number of hazardous safety conditions by two safety observers.

In

the second phase two s h ift supervisors used the safety checklist to
record hazardous safety conditions.

In the last phase data were

taken but the supervisory safety checklist was not used.

The data

from a ll observations were discussed in safety meetings near the end
of each s h ift.

Results indicated that the frequency of hazardous

safety conditions declined 32% for the morning sh ift and 21% for the
afternoon s h ift when comparing baseline figures to those recorded
during the last phase.

The results indicated that the use of a safety

checklist in safety meetings may be effective in reducing unsafe
working conditions.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Industrial safety in the United States is of great importance to
both public and private concerns.

Injuries totaled 2,300,000 in

1979 and there were 13,200 deaths. Work related injuries resulted in
80.000 workers suffering permanent impairments and contributed to
245.000 work days lost (National Safety Council [N .S.C .], 1980).

Over

12 b illio n dollars were paid in worker compensation; costs of lost
wages, medical expenses, insurance administrative costs, property
damage, and lost work time brought the total figure for losses to 27.3
b illio n dollars (U.S. Department of Commerce [D.O.C.], 1979).

There

was a death every 40 minutes and an injury every 14 seconds.

The

average cost for each worker was 280 dollars (N.S.C., 1980).

The

total amount of loss does not take into account lost production, new
worker training, worker law suits or other considerations.

Attempts

to reduce these numbers for unsafe conditions and worker safety
incidents have looked at various solutions to the problem.

Possible

solutions to the problem for the most part have focused on unsafe
working conditions or unsafe employee behaviors.
The annual rate of accidental deaths has decreased 22% since 1968
(D.O.C., 1979).

This decrease is believed to be largely due to public

policy resulting from a greater awareness and new technology.

A

1
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recent trend that demonstrates an increase in accident figures
indicates that while new engineering developments and advances in
design and materials must continue, a greater level of concentration
should be aimed towards identifying behavioral strategies
(Sulzer-Azaroff, 1982).
Current researchers have explored many aspects of safety
performance in the work setting.

One approach examined the theories

of accident causation (Hale and Hale, 1970; Torrie, 1983).

The

problem with this approach was the researchers could not be certain
there was a direct relationship between the actual incident and any
specific causal factor.

Most studies use the correlation between an

event such as the enactment of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
and the figures resulting from the recent trends in the data (Komaki,
Collins, and Penn, 1982).

This is an example of a d iffic u lty found in

many areas of research on the prevention of occupational accidents.
researcher saw evidence of the problem in worker awareness of the
safety program to be implemented at Oldsmobile.
Another d iffic u lty is operationally defining what is and what is
not safe behavior for the given situation (Cohen, Smith, and Anger,
1980).

This involves interviewing safety experts, workers, and

supervisors to clearly define both safe and unsafe practices for a
given situation; examining accident reports and safety patterns; and
also studying the physical arrangements of equipment, materials, and
workers.

Another area of concern is getting complete reports on the

actual frequency of industrial accidents (O'Connel and Meyers, 1966;
Rubinski and Smith, 1973).

Each of these areas mentioned differed in
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the approach, methods, and types of suggested intervention to be
used but were similar in that their purpose was to reduce the
frequency of safety accidents.
With more acceptance of behavioral principles in the
business world, researchers have used behavioral modification
techniques in the safety research area (Smith, Anger, and Uslan,
1978).

Another area researchers have studied is the number of safety

hazards present in a specific situation in comparison with what is
normal for that particular industrial fie ld (Sulzer-Azaroff and
DeSantamaria, 1980).

In a related study extensive comparisons were

made on the safety efforts of high and low accident firms matched for
type of industry, size and geographical location (Cohen, Smith, and
Cohen, 1975).

The last major area is the setting and following of

safety requirements and regulations (Fiedler and Chemers, 1974).
Komaki, Heinzmann, and Lawson, (1980) established that employee
feedback in conjunction with establishing rules and regulations has
been effective as a motivational strategy in four sections of a city
vehicle maintenance division but problems occurred in sustaining
performance gains i f feedback was not available three times a week.
Safety performance and effective means of measuring i t have been
studied in a number of ways.

Many of the early studies (Paul,

Robertson and Herzberg, 1969) focused on employee factors such as
accident proneness, job s k ills , attention span, psychological make-up,
and personal goals.

Industrial research began to apply incentives

(e.g. extra privileges, time o ff, bonus points which could be
exchanged for tangible items) for meeting or exceeding the required
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norms.

Management also started to supply workers with feedback on

desired performance.

This included the posting of graphs and posters

and worker participation in the setting of safety goals (Komaki,
Barwick, and Scott, 1979; Laner and S ell, 1960; Smith, Anger, and
Uslan, 1978).
Two previous research studies are very important to this study.
Their importance is that they laid the foundation for the present
research.

In many ways this study is a systematic replication of

elements involved in one or both of the ea rlier studies.

The f ir s t

study was in 1978 title d , "Behavioral Ecology and Accident Prevention"
(Sulzer-Azaroff, 1978).

This research focused on the presentation of

informational feedback concerning hazards and hazardous safety
conditions in a collection of university research laboratories.
Researchers investigated the effects of reinforcing or aversive
contingencies on the pattern of safe actions by the subjects.

The

contingencies basically involved social acceptance or nonacceptance of
subjects' actions concerning safety practices.

This investigation was

very similar to this researcher's in that the program could be
incorporated with ease, l i t t l e time was required for implementation,
and the costs were relatively low.

Sulzer-Azaroff' s study was similar

to this researcher's in that i t also suggested that the use of a
checklist to behaviorally define safe practices in combination with
positively reinforcing the safe behavior is a viable approach to
occupational accident reduction.

Another feature the 1978 study

shared with this researcher's was that the focus was not on behavior
its e lf, but on the products of unsafe practices, i.e . on unsafe
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conditions resulting from unsafe actions.

The intervention

(Sulzer-Azaroff, 1978) led to an overall decline in the number of
hazardous safety conditions.

The major difference between

Sulzer-Azaroff's 1978 study and this study was the environment in
which the intervention took place.

Certainly, differences in

occupational function, educational level, and other social factors
existed.
The second study of the greatest significance to the research was
"Industrial Safety Hazard Reduction Through Performance Feedback"
(Sulzer-Azaroff and DeSantamaria, 1980).

Here researchers implemented

a "feedback package" to th e ir supervisors which was designed to
prevent occupational accidents.

As with the present study, the

supervisors were presented with observational data, congratulated on
good performance, and were asked for th eir input.

As with both the

1978 study by Sulzer-Azaroff and this study, the program of planned
intervention could be instituted within the normal operating
guidelines of plant a c tivity.

The 1980 Sulzer-Azaroff and

DeSantamaria study had further sim ilarities in that i t focused on an
area involved in production.

As industrial management places its

emphasis on production, both studies shared the necessary quality of
not having an adverse action or reaction on assembly time.

The

present study and the Sulzer-Azaroff studies were also alike in that
they resulted in a greater level of worker input on potential safety
hazards and a neater, more organized production plant.

The major

dissim ilarity between the 1980 oulzer-Azaroff and DeSantamaria
procedure and this researcher's was that Sulzer-Azaroff1s was designed
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to prevent workers from ascertaining exactly what was being recorded,
while this researcher's study made ex p lic it what was being recorded.
The effects that a safety checklist may have on the number of
safety incidents and general safety conditions on the whole are worth
further investigation.

The potential benefits are numerous and may

have a positive impact on a ll levels of the worker hierarchy.
is both a p ro fit incentive and good public relations.

Safety

I t enhances

worker interest and enriches job quality through worker awareness of
employer's concern with th e ir well being.
An effective safety program w ill also help reduce insurance and
local government costs.

This is achieved by having lower insurance

premiums, cheaper tax appropriations, and overall less expenses that
result directly in lower costs.

(U.S. Labor Department, 1980)

The realization of a positive safety environment must not be
looked at in terms of considering only what must be done from a legal
standpoint.

Research has shown that to have a successful safety

program there must also be adequate operating procedures as well as
proper equipment maintenance (Fine, 1974).
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of a
supervisory safety checklist on the reduction of hazardous safety
conditions.
reasons.

The safety checklist was researched for a number of

Safety personnel at General Motors were concerned that the

safety training that supervisors had completed as requirements of
accepting th eir positions were being effective for only a very short
period of time.

In addition, the information they had been exposed to
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was either forgotten or ignored.

Evidence of the existing safety

conditions as well as accident statistics supported this belief.
These safety professionals believed that a checklist would serve as a
needed reminder for the supervisors.

Another major reason was that

many situations that were potentially hazardous to worker safety
existed that had been either missed or ignored during the supervisory
safety training.

The reason for this was that there was l i t t l e

updating of safety training for supervisors who had been on the job a
number of years.

(There was a regular meeting but i t was usually just

an update on new or revised federal regulations and laws; very l i t t l e
was accomplished for actual supervisors of specific line shifts during
this tim e.)

The last major reason that the safety researchers fe lt

that a safety checklist might be helpful was that i t may a le rt both
supervisors and line personnel that a problem existed and that
management was concerned in altering the situation to a more
acceptable level.
One example of positive attributes resulting from managerial use
of a safety checklist was supported in a study at General Motors
where management was attempting to retrain workers who had been laid
off.

Workers f e lt that the program using a safety checklist was a

renewed effo rt to insure safety for a ll workers (General Motors to
Retrain Laid Off Workers, 1983).

Another example of the use of a

safety checklist was a study completed by conductors to insure a safe
journey (Improving Conductor Safety Performance by Implementing a
Duties Worklist, 1979).

The use of a checklist to improve other areas

of performance includes using one to improve both the quality and
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quantity of cold calls by telemarketing professionals (Raising Sales
by Verifying Daily A ctivities, 1979); another is the use of a job
duties requirement l i s t to assist in the training of new individuals
(Harmon, 1981).

The use of a daily checklist in the wide variety of

settings mentioned above showed a wide range of settings in which a
condition could be reduced or increased as researchers desired.
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CHAPTER I I

METHOD
Setti ng
This study was conducted in a large automotive plant located in
Lansing, Michigan.

The fa c ility was involved in each and every phase

of automotive assembly.

Research was conducted in the east wing

engine assembly department.

I t focused specifically on the parts

assembly involved in the fin al product of constructing an automotive
engine.

The specific format followed in this study evolved from a

recent safety program developed by Oldsmobile safety personnel
title d "Safe Care."

Upon hearing about this program this researcher

approached the safety director to gain permission to make
observations and to use this opportunity to investigate the use of a
supervisory checklist.

Approval was granted by the home office of

General Motors Corporation with the understanding that certain rules
and regulations would have to be observed.

Subjects
Subjects were the employees and two sh ift supervisors of two
different shifts for the east engine assembly department.
employees were fu ll time personnel:

All

They worked eight hour

9
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shifts, either from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. or from 4:30 p.m. to 1 a.m.
Each sh ift employed 154 people.
men and 43 women.

On the morning sh ift there were 111

Their ages ranged from 24 to 59 years.

afternoon s h ift there were 102 men and 52 women.
27 to 57 years.

On the

Ages ranged from

All employees on both shifts were included in the

study.

Design
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of a
supervisory safety checklist as an intervention technique to reduce
the number of hazardous safety conditions at an automotive assembly
plant.

A checklist of 15 categories of possible safety condition

hazards was produced by the organizational safety director and his
assistant.

A lis t of the categories is included in Appendix A.

The

checklist was designed for the immediate work area (East wing engine
assembly) but also took into account some general safety rules
mandated for the entire plant.
shown in Table 1.

The overall design of the study is

During the baseline phase two safety observers, A

and B, took baseline data using the checklist.

The checklist was

then used by the s h ift supervisors during checklist training to assure
that supervisors were able to detect unsafe conditions.

The two

safety observers continued to take data which is represented on both
graphs.

During the final phase supervisors were instructed to
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continue attending to safety considerations but were not required to
use the safety checklists.

The safety observors took data to

determine whether safety hazards were lower during the final phase
than they had been during baseline.
The meetings referred to in Table 1 were an important part of
the study.

They were attended by both safety observers, the safety

director and the researcher during the baseline phase and were held to
discuss the study, get agreement on definitions, etc.

The union

representatives, who had been informed of the study e a rlie r (the union
representatives occasionally used the checklist to make observations),
began attending the meetings for the f ir s t time during checklist
training.

The safety meeting was held for 30 to 45 minutes towards

the end of each sh ift.

During the checklist training the supervisors

took the place of the safety observers.

In the last phase the safety

observers replaced the s h ift supervisors for post training.

Hazardous

safety conditions data were reviewed during the meetings and possible
solutions for hazardous conditions were discussed.

Praise was also

delivered by the safety director during the checklist training period
to the sh ift supervisors for any reductions in hazardous safety
conditions.
The design implemented in the study was implemented across shifts
to measure the effectiveness of the supervisory safety checklist on
the reduction of hazardous safety conditions.

Baseline was recorded

on both shifts for two weeks (ten working days).
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METHODOLOGY - TABLE 1
PERSON

BASELINE

CHECKLIST TRAINING

POST TRAINING

Safety Observer A

Took data/Attended Meetings

Observed/Took data

Took data/Attended Meetings

Safety Observer B

Took data/Attended Meetings

Observed/Took data

Took data/Attended Meetings

Supervisor A

NorMal work procedure

Took data.
Inpleaented checklist.
Attended Mcetings.

Perfomed supervisory
function without safety
checklist.

Supervisor B

Noraal work procedure

Took data.
IopleMented checklist.
Attended Meetings.

PerforMed supervisory
function without safety
checklist.

Safety Director

Cooputed reliability.
Hade occasional observations.
Attended Meetings.

CoMputed reliability
Attended Meetings.

CoMputed reliability.
Attended Meetings.
Delivered feedback.
Reviewed data.

Union Rep. A

Observed occasionally on 1st
shift

Attended Meetings.

Attended Meetings.
Generated feedback consents.
Reviewed data.

Union Rep. B

Observed occasionally on 2nd
shift.

Attended Meetings

Attended Meetings.
Generated feedback coMMents.
Reviewed data.

Safety Researcher

Observed
Gathering inforMation
Attended Meetings

Observed
Attended Meetings.
Gathered InforMation.

Attended Meetings.
Gathered InforMation.
Reviewed data.

13

Observation/Procedure

Upon fin alization of the checklist, a ll aspects were discussed in
detail by safety personnel to reduce any discrepancies that might have
existed-

Agreement between data takers was developed through the oral

discussion of each item on the checklist as to an individual's
interpretation of context and meaning in the period prior to baseline
and supervisory checklist training.

Supervisors and safety observersv

were required by the safety director to pass a verbal quiz to reduce
possible discrepancies.
Research data were collected over a period of 11 weeks.

In the

f ir s t phase baseline data were recorded on the number of hazardous
safety conditions by two safety observers.

In the second phase the

sh ift supervisors also used the safety checklist to record what they
believed to be hazardous safety conditions.

In the last phase data

were again taken by both safety observers but this time the
supervisory safety checklist was not used.

Data were collected during

the times that both shifts worked, Monday through Friday.

No data

were taken for overtime or for weekends as this would have required
accounting for too many other variables ( i . e . , different workers,
different conditions).

The safety director would occasionally spend

time observing during both shifts.

The observation was completed at a

randomly selected time and would last for approximately 30 minutes.
On a few occasions the safety director was present in the plant at the
time data were being recorded but no interaction between parties took
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place.

When a safety incident occurred, the conditions present were

noted by the observers.

A safety incident was defined as an action

with potential for injury.

The category on the checklist pertaining

to the hazard in question would then be explored in-depth to during
the meetings allow for a ll parties to understand why a particular
action was or was not a hazard.
The recording materials used were accident investigation report
sheets, a hazardous conditions definition sheet, and a safety
checklist.

These materials are located in Appendeces A, B, and F.

The safety observers became fam iliar with the use of the safety
checklist by having tr ia l runs and then verifying agreement prior to
the taking of baseline data.

The sh ift supervisors became fam iliar

with the checklist during the one week phase labeled as checklist
training.

The safety observers performed tr ia l runs with the safety

director before baseline and with the supervisors at the onset of the
second phase.

On two occasions the safety director's assistant stood

in due to a scheduling conflict but any possible impact this had was
judged to be minimal.
All components which made up the checklist were operationally
defined and discussed to determine i f any discrepancies existed and
to improve accuracy and agreement of the material.

Both safety and

supervisory observers were observing the safety conditions present;
however, complete independence was not acheieved because this
experimenter, the safety director, safety observers, and
supervisory observers occasionally inspected safety incidents and
accidents simultaneously.

This was done informally and by chance
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and no r e lia b ility data was computed during this time.

This also

enabled this experimenter to gain f ir s t hand experience into existing
conditions.

The observer r e lia b ility was performed randomly once a

week throughout the study by the safety director.

The director's

observations were compared with the safety observer sheets for the day
of the week on which he made re lia b ility observation checks. The
observation times varied for both shifts as to when r e lia b ility was
checked. R e lia b ility was calculated by using the percentage agreement
between the observers and the safety director for each respective
phase of the study.

This was figured by dividing the total number of

agreements by the total number of agreements and disagreements added
together and multiplying by 100.

Frequency of Hazardous Safety Conditions
The frequency of hazardous safety conditions was the total
number of hazardous conditions noted by observers on the checklist.
Hazard inspections were carried out at random times once a week for
each sh ift by the safety director to observe conditions present and to
investigate the conditions present were those being reported by both
safety observers and s h ift supervisors.
draw of a playing card.

The time was chosen by the

The inspections were made with no attempt to

conceal the intent of the inspectors.

Any possible hazards not

included on the checklist were noted but not included in the data
taking.

All comparisons represented herein were made based upon the

observations of the two safety observers.

The observations made by
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the sh ift supervisors were used to insure that the supervisors were
I :"'
.
■
' '
understanding the use of the checklist, to help them identify
hazardous safety conditions, and to fa c ilita te the study format.
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CHAPTER I I I

RESULTS
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the total number of hazardous safety
conditions existing for shifts one and two during the baseline,
during checklist training, and after withdrawal of the supervisory
safety checklist.

During the baseline the number of hazardous

conditions was noted by the safety observers.
of 7 to 16 hazardous safety conditions.
to 15.

S hift one had a range

Shift two had a range from 8

The mean for s h ift one was 12.2 while sh ift two had a mean of

11.8 during baseline.

The mean for interobserver r e lia b ility for the

length of the study was 93%.

The r e lia b ility ranged from 73% to 100%.

During the one week training period the range for sh ift one was
from 12 to 15.

The mean for sh ift one was 13.2.

period the range for s h ift two was from 10 to 14.

During this same
The mean was 12.6.

The training period involved the sh ift supervisors' recording of
hazardous safety conditions.

This period differed from baseline in

that the hazardous safety conditions were being noted by the sh ift
supervisors and the safety observers but only the safety observers'
data were used for comparative purposes.
After withdrawal of the supervisory safety checklist the
mean for sh ift one dropped to 8.3.

During the same period the

average for s h ift two dropped to 9.3.
withdrawal was from 4 to 15.

The range for s h ift one after

For sh ift two the range was also 4

17
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to 15.

These figures represented a 32% drop for s h ift one and 21%

drop for s h ift two.

Results were similar for both departments in

that mean frequency of hazardous safety conditions decreased after
training, when compared with baseline levels.
the removal of the checklist.

This phase represented

The data reported in the results

indicated to this researcher that the hazardous safety checklist and
the safety meetings using i t contributed to the drop in the number of
hazardous safety conditions present for both shifts.

While the data

were not conclusive, the use of the checklist was s t i l l seen as
beneficial.
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CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION
The results of this research lend support to the original
hypothesis formulated by the safety director at Oldsmobile.

That is ,

safety meetings and training involving the use of a safety checklist
by the immediate supervisor may result in a reduction of hazardous
conditions that the workers must face.

The safety professionals had

originally made an assumption that a reduction in hazardous conditions
would lead immediately to a reduction in the number of safety
incidents (accidents, near misses, non-reported occurrences).

This

assumption was considered to be correct after management chose to
continue the study following the recording of preliminary data for
baseline and the training phase.

The number of hazardous safety

conditions was on the decline and the safety director believed the
in itia l assumption concerning the relative merits of the safety
checklist and corresponding meetings was correct; however, i t is not
clear that the data support this belief.
This research supported many other factors that have been
researched in the past.

I t was recognized that the involvement of

the supervisory personnel as well as financial support from top level
management is a must i f workers are to see the importance of safety

21
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conditions.

This was reflected in that the hourly workers were able

to see that management had placed enough emphasis on the program to be
personally involved.

Research completed also indicated that safety

may be improved by investigating work centered variables and th eir
direct connection to safety.

Most research recently completed has

centered on employee related factors to the extent of placing work
centered variables in the background.

The cost of studying work

centered factors was also much less than attempting to interview,
tra in , retrain, hire or terminate employees would have been.
However, some of the hazardous safety conditions were eventually very
costly after management decided improvements had to be made (changing
of certain machinery, down time while equipment was modified, and
implementation of new safety devices).

The equipment changes were a ll

made after the conclusion of this study.
The resulting figures of a 32% drop for sh ift one and a 21% drop
for s h ift two may have actually been due in part to factors other than
the checklist. Once the program showed in itia l success people began to
place more of an emphasis on safety aspects.

This may have resulted

in a decline in hazards due to an awareness and not specifically the
checklist its e lf.

The data indicated an increase in hazardous safety

occurrences during the last two weeks of the study.

The research

s taff attributed this to the workers becoming lackadaisical toward the
study as a result of their knowledge that they would soon be changing
s h ift hours and the study would end.

Baseline data indicated a slight

increase in hazardous conditions for both shifts employed in the
study.

Researchers attributed the increase in hazardous conditions
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observed to anxiety by the data takers' feelings that they may not
have been observing a ll of the hazardous conditions present.

A second

contributing factor may have been that the observers were gaining a
better insight into what the checklist was developed to investigate
and were thus noticing more safety hazards.
The direct cost of the checklist was relatively low.

All

supervisors at the plant had been trained on safety measures available
to them and how to recognize potential hazards during their
pre-supervisory training period.

A major problem with this training

however, is that very l i t t l e time was actually spent in the shop.

The

use of safety videotapes, cassettes, workshops, and discussion groups
had been helpful but may not have been enough.
The safety department was optimistic that the use of this
supervisory checklist would help th eir supervisors recognize
specifically what constituted an unsafe or hazardous working
condition.

Daily comments from workers, safety personnel and

management as well as results documented herein would indicate this
was indeed true.

As was previously noted, no attempts were made to

discourage employees from finding out what the program was about or
what i t was intended to do.

This may be viewed as a lim itation in

the study as no figures could be obtained on how much bias may have
existed due to employee awareness.

Another lim itation was that there

were no visible consequences for completing the safety checklist
carefully and as trained to do.

This was compounded by the fact that

the researchers were limited in what they could do with th eir
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personnel due to union regulations.

S till another lim itation was that

in my role as an observer and researcher there was a lim it on the
amount of information that was available to me as an outsider.
Production and other data measured during the safety study may have
provided some interesting information.

This resulted in there being

very l i t t l e production information available to me on either s h ift,
both before and after implementation.

(Union people f e lt that

information may have possibly reflected badly on one or more of the
personnel involved; under union agreement many things are only open to
certain personnel at yearly reviews, grievance hearings, or as
evidence for termination.)
How much generalization this study had must be considered from a
variety of positions.

Each division at Oldsmobile has a different

function and i t is almost lik e many separate companies.

There was

evidence researchers f e lt generalization was feasible in that a
follow-up plan was being developed to be applied to other divisions in
the plant.

The use of the safety hazard checklist can be generalized

with only a few minor modifications to many different types of
settings (both industrial and non-industrial).

This researcher would

recommend very highly the use of a training procedure implementing a
checklist in place of completely retraining supervisors in a ll
applicable situations.
Like a ll research, the safety research conducted by this author
had some weaknesses and problems associated with i t .

A major problem

was this researchers' study allowed limited generalization to larger
or different populations (Grimaldi and Simonds, 1974).

This was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25

evidenced by the presence of a work environment that was to ta lly
union, and had a constant work force.

These two variables are

often not present together in a work situation.

Another problem

existed in that data are sometimes accidently or in ten tially omitted
(Herman, 1979).

This problem potentially existed due to environmental

attributes of the study.

The environmental problems included the

chaotic work pace of the plant which could prove distracting as well
as the loudness generated by the machinery which resulted in minor
d iffic u ltie s in communication.

Another possible problem was that

outside variables may not have been given due consideration as to
their impact on the outcome of the study ( i . e . , time lag between
recordings, worker maturity).

Previous research that attempted to

focus on how much affect feedback systems had for employees and
supervisors showed significantly positive results but failed to
completely convince researchers that their feedback systems were the
determining reason for the positive results exhibited.
One concern this researcher had with the research was that the
collection of data during the baseline period was not completely
in fa llib le as a few minor alterations were s t i l l being made to the
checklist.

One example was the further defining of existing terms

applicable to the checklist.

This concern was not severe enough to

have had a large impact on the study or to have altered the opinion
presented here that the plan was effective.
The dependent variable was the number of safety conditions
defined as being hazardous.

The safety people noted that as few
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assumptions as possible should be made, but that due to many factors
a few would have to be made.

One such assumption was that i f the

number of hazardous conditions was reduced then a reduction in safety
incidents would lik e ly follow.

No safety data were presented on the

decline in accident frequency.

As the purpose of this study involved

the potential reduction of hazardous safety conditions and not
the reduction in safety incidents the assumption was believed
to be tenable.
This researcher concluded at least temporarily the supervisory
safety checklist had much potential for improving safety programs for
the entire plant.

Safety personnel have made recommendations that a

need exists for a study to be conducted using a safety checklist in
the plant with foremen, line-leaders, and even specific areas with
machinery that have proven to be a problem.
One clear benefit of the supervisory checklist is that i t w ill
help to teach a desired behavior in a given situation.

Researchers

can study the application of incentives, or the effect of aversive
stim uli, but i f a behavior has not been properly learned th eir efforts
w ill be s tifle d (Sulzer-Azaroff, 1978).

Another benefit is shown in

that the supervisors are able to visualize what is safe behavior
as the checklist assists in breaking employee actions down into
manageable components.

This w ill then result in more specific rather

than general instructions, which w ill often result in greater
compliance (Peterson, 1984).

The use of a supervisory safety

checklist also holds promise in the training of individuals new to the
job.

Individuals who learned their job in it ia lly without the benefit
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of making errors are more lik e ly to perform th eir duties correctly
(Peterson, 1976).

One area of safety research this researcher would

like to see explored is what schedule of reinforcement is the best for
improving safety performance.

Another suggestion for future research

is to study how safety consciousness can be b u ilt into supervisory
styles.

There is also a need for follow-up studies to be completed to

maintain the positive attributes of a checklist.
The researchers attributed the decreases in hazardous safety
conditions for both shifts to three major reasons.

F irst, the greater

awareness of plant workers that safety problems were present and that
management was intent on reducing these hazards.

This was solidified

by the posting of safety records for each period on the workers'
bulletin board.

The second major reason for the decline in hazardous

conditions was greater awareness of existing conditions on the part of
the supervisors involved in the study.

This was reinforced by praise

and other positive reinforcers for correct actions.
reason was the actual checklist its e lf.

The last major

Evidence of this is reflected

in the planned implementation of a second study using a safety
checklist in either a different section of the plant or to assist in
worker training at specific job functions.
The experimental design used was believed to have been an
effective tool with which to implement the safety checklist but a few
problems did exist with the format. One such problem was the
relatively short time allowed for the taking of data in the training
phase.

There seemed to be some confusion as to the best way to

fam iliarize the supervisors with the planned format.

A second
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problem was that due to the design used, there was some concern over
whether the results obtained were as a result of the presentation of
the checklist or as a result of removal.
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APPENDIX A

SUPERVISORY SAFETY CHECKLIST CATEGORIES

1.

Lighting

2.

Ventilation

3.

Materials

4.

Liquids

5.

Electrical

6.

Equipment

7.

Apparel

8.

Hydraulics

9.

Housekeeping

10.

Hazardous Materials

11.

Machinery Guards

12.

Work Area

13.

General Machinery

14.

Fire Safety Equipment

15.

Personal Safety Devices
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APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS OF HAZARDOUS SAFETY CONDITIONS

1. Bulbs or lamps burned out.

Incorrect wattage in work areas.

2. Improper exposure to paints, fumes, smells, or gasses.
inadequate use of heating or cooling controls.

Lack or

3. Improperly stored in work areas, aisles, or fir e ex it lanes.
4. Leakage from machinery or equipment not cleaned up or
overflowing.
5.

Circuit overload, pull conduits, or exposed wires present.
Solenoid covers missing, loose, or leaking. Ungrounded outlets,
defective wiring, or improper drop cords. Lack of explosion
proof switches or improper clearance for disconnects.

6.

Stools or benches damaged or unsafe. Hand tools improperly
used, stored, defective, damaged, or not properly grounded.

7. Improper footwear or loose clothing being worn in prohibited
areas. Wearing of rings or other jewelry.
8.

Air tools exceeding p .s .i. lim its.
pressure released valves.

Inadequate use or testing of

9. Debris on floor. Maintenance materials le f t in shop areas.
Unsafe conditions caused by non-employees.
10.

Improper use, mixture or storage. Usage in restricted areas.
Gasses and liquids under improper pressure.

11.

Damaged, bent, missing, or out of place.
oiled or greased.

Power guard locks not

12. Production stock out of place. Hoses, bands, or grates
exposed. Aisle lines not observed. Gondolas, baskets, or
pallets not properly stacked. Personal items out of place.
13.

In need of o il, cleaning, grease, or routine maintenance.

14.

Exits not properly marked. Smoking in no smoking sections.
Blocked or locked fir e exits. Fire extinguishers missing, low
on pressure, or improperly mounted.

15.

Not provided, not used, inoperable, damaged, or disconnected.
Safety locks not used in required areas.
30
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APPENDIX C

REPORT OF NON-MJURY ACCIDENT
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APPENDIX E
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SUPERVISORY SAFETY CHECKLIST

Plant/Division/Department

___________________________ _________

Bin"! di ng/Bay/Secti on_________ ____________ __________________________
General Supervisor_________________ __ _______ _____________________
Supervisor__________________ _________________________ _______ _
Date and Time_______________ ___________________ _________________
Project Name________________ ___________ ____ ______________________
Recording Agent___________________ ___________________________

Category
___________________
1.

Lighting

2.

Ventilation

3.

Materials

4.

Liquids

5.

Electrical

6.

Equipment

7.

Apparel

8.

Hydraulics

Meets Code
Specific Problem Area
Action Taken/Required
Follow-up Date
Yes/No__________________________________________________ ____________ '

in
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SUPERVISORY SAFETY CHECKLIST
Page 2

Category
______________________
9.

Meets Code
Specific Problem Area
Action Taken/Required
Follow-up Date
Yes/No _________ _______________________ ___________________________ ____________

Housekeeping

10.

Hazardous Materials

11.

Machinery Guards

12.

Work Area

13.

General Machinery

14.

Fire Safety Equipment

15.

Personal Safety Devices

LJ
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